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CAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES DISAGREE 
BUT STILL GET ALONG?  
David A. Hopkins* 
 
RUSSELL MUIRHEAD, THE PROMISE OF PARTY IN A POLARIZED AGE 
(HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 317. HARDCOVER $ 39.95. 
Most political scientists who specialize in the study of American politics have tra-
ditionally viewed the institution of the political party with a certain degree of benevo-
lence. As we are constantly reminded by students, relatives, friends, acquaintances in the 
news media, and colleagues in other academic disciplines, this inclination decidedly sets 
us apart from many of our fellow citizens. But the congressional expert appreciates the 
critical role played by parties in supplying leadership and organizational structure to the 
legislative branch; the scholar of the presidency recognizes how the president’s party 
provides a loyal base of support among both fellow elites and the mass public that makes 
effective governance possible; and the behaviorist notes the crucial importance of party 
identification in placing voters within the political world and mobilizing them to partici-
pate in elections. Defenders of a strong and vibrant party system must contend with an 
American political culture in which parties are frequent targets for dissatisfaction of eve-
ry sort and “partisan” is a familiar epithet. Yet many scholars continue to share the view 
expressed by the pioneering political scientist E. E. Schattschneider, who wrote in 1942 
that “the political parties created democracy and . . . modern democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of the parties,” even as the current state of party politics in America in-
spires growing concern both within and outside the academy.1 
Though it follows in this tradition, Russell Muirhead’s The Promise of Party in a 
Polarized Age is, as its title indicates, also very much a product of our contemporary 
era.2 While the intellectual pedigree of anti-partyism in American thought stretches back 
over more than two centuries to Federalist #10 and George Washington’s Farewell Ad-
dress, the specific sins of which the parties are accused have varied over time, from dem-
agoguery to corruption to philosophical incoherence. The most discussed, and lamented, 
attribute of contemporary American politics is the phenomenon of partisan polariza-
                                                            
 * Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston College.  
 1. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942). 
 2. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD, THE PROMISE OF PARTY IN A POLARIZED AGE (2014). 
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tion—a term that is popularly applied to a set of related but analytically distinct trends 
that have progressed steadily over the past thirty years. These developments notably in-
clude: (1) an increase in the collective partisan unity and aggregate ideological extremity 
of elected officeholders and candidates at the expense of a declining moderate bloc in 
each party; (2) a resurgence of party-loyal voting in the electorate after several decades 
of rampant partisan defection and ticket-splitting; (3) an expansion of sharp partisan con-
flict into new policy domains, such as racial and cultural issues, that previously cut 
across party lines; and (4) a growth in the extent to which the interaction of party leaders 
with their counterparts in the opposition takes the form of personal rancor and procedural 
hardball, echoed by more vituperative expressions of mutual ill-feeling between Demo-
cratic and Republican supporters in the mass public. As the surging tide of partisanship 
strains against a constitutional framework designed by avowed anti-partisans to divide 
power among multiple independent actors, resulting over the past quarter-century in such 
visible manifestations as frequent legislative gridlock, multiple government shutdowns 
and other governing crises, and even a presidential impeachment, many analysts have 
come to view party polarization as the biggest challenge faced by the contemporary po-
litical system. A number of prominent empirically-oriented scholars—including Norman 
J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Morris P. Fiorina—have concluded that these devel-
opments pose a serious threat to the present and future character of representative de-
mocracy in the United States.3 
The phenomenon of polarization is reflected in a growing academic literature, a 
steady stream of popular punditry, and a series of rhetorical pledges by politicians who 
make (mostly unfulfilled) promises to transcend it—such as candidate George W. Bush’s 
vow to be “a uniter, not a divider”4 and President Barack Obama’s claim to govern a na-
tion that is “more than a collection of red states and blue states [but] the United States of 
America.”5 Yet near-ubiquitous complaints about the polarized state of politics today are 
often unaccompanied by a coherent, plausible vision of a preferred alternative. Scarcer 
still are contemporary analyses that reaffirm political scientists’ traditional advocacy of 
strong, well-organized parties and vigorous electoral competition, even as they 
acknowledge the evident flaws in the current party system. The Promise of Party in a 
Polarized Age aims to fill this void, advancing an ideal of “not less partisanship, but bet-
ter partisanship” that strives to preserve parties’ beneficial attributes while simultaneous-
ly avoiding the pathologies that have caused such increasing alarm among observers of 
twenty-first-century politics.6 
This approach is a refreshing corrective to much of the normative response to po-
larization in the popular media, which often draws upon older anti-party themes. Aside 
from those who simply complain that their least-liked party is too extreme or wields too 
                                                            
 3. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); MORRIS P. FIORINA 
WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005); 
MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, DISCONNECT? THE BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2009). 
 4. David Horowitz, “I’m a uniter, not a divider,” SALON (May 6, 1999), 
http://www.salon.com/1999/05/06/bush_2. 
 5. Barack Obama, President, 2012 Presidential Acceptance Speech (Nov. 7, 2012). 
 6. MUIRHEAD, supra note 2, at xii. 
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much power, most critics of our current partisan battles fall into one of two categories, 
which I will label the Neo-Progressives and the Bipartisans. The Neo-Progressives, like 
their turn-of-the-century namesakes, regard partisan politics with innate skepticism, even 
when they actively participate in it themselves. They view political conflict as largely 
artificial, fanned by pandering politicians or corrupting special interests for their own 
selfish benefit, and advocate a variety of institutional reforms—jungle primaries,7 anti-
gerrymandering restrictions, stringent campaign finance regulations—that are intended to 
reduce the scope of partisan disagreement by productively tinkering with the mechanics 
of the democratic process. 
Yet the Neo-Progressives display limited faith in the wisdom of the average voter. 
They tout scientific inquiry, objectivity, and expertise as a preferred means of settling 
political disputes and addressing social problems, and perceive the modern Republican 
Party in particular to be a malevolent force that cynically but effectively exploits mass 
ignorance and prejudice. Neo-Progressives overwhelmingly reside on the ideological 
left—even the far left—but demonstrate little enthusiasm for the rough-and-tumble skir-
mishes or messy compromises that characterize the real world of politics. Their political 
affect mirrors Barack Obama’s cool and intellectual demeanor, technocratic bent, and 
visible distaste for old-fashioned political give-and-take, even if their enthusiasm for 
Obama’s actual record in office is sometimes less than fulsome.8 
The Bipartisans, in contrast, view savvy deal-making as the essence of politics at 
its best. They celebrate now-rare cases of successful policy collaboration between Dem-
ocratic and Republican leaders, regarding the four decades between World War II and 
the presidency of Ronald Reagan as an idyllic political age populated by a cadre of hero-
ic figures who forged national consensus by exhibiting seriousness of purpose, prudence 
in judgment, and country-over-party statesmanship. Rather than view voters with deri-
sion or condescension, Bipartisans claim to speak on behalf of a sensible and well-
meaning American public that remains (by their account) ideologically centrist, political-
ly pragmatic, and habitually exasperated by partisan squabbling. They applaud politi-
cians who claim to “stand on principle” to the extent that said principle compels them to 
take more moderate issue positions than the bulk of their fellow party members; other-
wise, they view insistent adherence to ideological precepts both as morally suspect—
                                                            
 7.  Jungle primaries, also called “top-two” or “qualifying” primaries, require all candidates for a single 
office to compete against each other in a preliminary round of voting, with the top two finishers advancing to 
the general election regardless of their party affiliation. Now in place in California, Louisiana, and Washington, 
jungle primaries are claimed by their advocates to reduce polarization by allowing voters to support (presuma-
bly moderate) candidates across party lines. Unlike the similar blanket primary, which was declared unconstitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) be-
cause it infringed on the parties’ associational rights, the jungle primary does not result in official party 
nominations. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Court in Washington State Grange v. Washington State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
 8.  For example, prominent Neo-Progressive activist Larry Lessig, a law professor at Harvard University, 
announced in September 2015 that he would launch a presidential candidacy designed to serve as a public ref-
erendum on a package of institutional reforms—campaign finance regulations most prominent among them. 
Lessig has often been critical of Obama’s presidency for being insufficiently transformative. See Andrew Pro-
kop, Larry Lessig: Bernie Sanders Has Been “Seduced” by Consultants, Is Too Focused on Winning, Vox, 
(Aug. 26, 2015, 11:35AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/8/26/9210417/lawrence-lessig-president. Lessig aban-
doned the presidential race two months later after failing to qualify for participation in the Democratic Party’s 
series of televised presidential debates. 
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because it represents tiresome self-righteousness or the excessive indulgence of doctri-
naire party activists—and as presenting a serious practical impediment to the proper 
working of government in a separation-of-powers system. They venerate the shrinking 
bloc of political figures like John McCain, Joseph Lieberman, and Michael Bloomberg 
who adopt the persona of the maverick partisan (or non-partisan) and who separate them-
selves from their party, or both parties, by positioning themselves at or near the political 
center rather than further to the left or right. 
In contrast to these familiar perspectives, The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age 
presents an intellectual defense of partisanship as an honorable cause rather than an 
avoidable or necessary evil. Unlike the Neo-Progressives, Muirhead views partisan dif-
ferences as properly reflecting an enduring tension among fundamentally irreconcilable 
but legitimate and sincerely-held values, chiding conflict-averse liberals who “are reluc-
tant to admit that they are in a partisan contest” and who “expect that reason alone will 
cause everyone eventually to agree with them.”9 Muirhead also demonstrates little en-
thusiasm for Neo-Progressive electoral reforms; he briefly endorses the stricter regula-
tion of campaign money10 but explains at greater length why proposals designed to com-
bat polarization by opening primary elections to voters outside the party are unlikely to 
succeed and might even prove counterproductive.11 In addition, he criticizes Barack 
Obama for echoing Neo-Progressives by often portraying his policies—and himself—as 
hovering above mere partisanship and ideological dogma in a higher plane of pure logic 
and common sense: 
 
Obama could not see the enduring relevance of liberalism and conserv-
atism, and he could not recognize the partisan character of his own 
convictions. . . . The post-partisan pretense that political argument is 
unnecessary amounts to a form of free-riding, where we neglect the 
team that carries our side of the argument from one contest to the next. 
Hidden in this pretense is an arrogant insistence that everyone should 
agree with us, without the bother of explaining why.12 
 
The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age also challenges several of the Bipartisans’ 
key beliefs and assumptions. “No law of nature places the optimal policy between the 
ideally preferred points of liberals and conservatives,” contends Muirhead. “On fiscal 
policy, health care, foreign policy—on any policy, the best approach might well be the 
position advocated for by one party.”13 He explicitly prefers unified to divided party 
control of the federal government14 and displays even less patience with contemporary 
nostalgia for the post-war era of cross-party coalition-building, arguing that it mostly re-
flected the anomalous presence in the Democratic Party of southern conservatives who 
also represented a major obstacle to the expansion of civil rights: “Racial segregation 
                                                            
 9. MUIRHEAD, supra note 2, at 14. 
 10. Id. at 247. 
 11. Id. at 146-72. 
 12. Id. at 210-11. 
 13.  Id. at 245-46. 
 14.  MUIRHEAD, supra note 7, at 260-64. 
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was not a sorry by-product of the system of bipartisan accommodation—it was the cause 
and the purpose of the system.”15 Nor does Muirhead share the Bipartisans’ discomfort 
with the commitment of many political leaders to non-centrist ideologies. “The ideologi-
cal dimensions of politics today are in themselves hardly troubling,” he writes, “and are 
far less severe than the ideological contests that roiled nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
politics.”16 
Yet, The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age is by no means a celebration of our 
increasingly polarized political world. While inhabiting the political scientist’s familiar 
role as a champion of parties and partisanship, Muirhead simultaneously surveys the cur-
rent state of party politics with considerable dismay. As a result, the book treads very 
carefully. It extols party loyalty, but of a particular, high-minded sort. It welcomes parti-
san competition, but within limits that our contemporary parties admittedly fail to re-
spect. It identifies the necessary contribution of parties to healthy and meaningful poli-
tics, but decries the merciless behavior of scheming party leaders who primarily seek 
strategic advantage over the opposition. The “promise of party” is alluring, but is far 
from being fulfilled. 
 
A Partisanship of Ideas and Ideals 
 
Political parties can be regarded in a number of ways: as coalitions of social 
groups, as amalgamations of program beneficiaries, as networks of policy-oriented activ-
ists, and so forth. For Muirhead, parties properly exist to advocate ideas. He is somewhat 
reluctant to identify ideology per se as the parties’ raison d’être—perhaps because, like 
many political theorists, he is sensitive to the ways in which party doctrine often deviates 
from pure philosophical reasoning. But he also declines to emphasize instrumental inter-
ests or salient social identities as essential foundations of partisanship, despite their im-
portant role in shaping the political orientations of many Americans. Muirhead prefers to 
describe the Democrats and Republicans as each ideally advancing “broad goals that de-
fine a partisan conception of the common good.”17 Partisanship becomes “respectable, 
even noble,” he writes, when it is based on “principles, convictions, and attachments.”18 
Why is it the party itself, rather than its associated ethos, that deserves our fealty as 
citizens? While one can adhere to personal convictions in isolation, Muirhead argues, 
partisanship is inherently a collective enterprise that involves productively engaging with 
others in the political arena. Partisanship at its best also requires recognizing the legiti-
macy of the opposition and the limits of social consensus; being a partisan tacitly 
acknowledges the rightful existence of other parties and the political contestation of 
one’s own beliefs. The ideal partisan is thus principled and passionate, but also modest, 
open-minded, and averse to combativeness and zealotry. He or she “aims to shape the 
moral character of the political community” but recognizes that opponents subscribe in 
                                                            
 15. Id. at 243. 
 16. Id. at 253. 
 17. Id. at 202. 
 18. Id. at 253. 
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good faith to an alternative set of values that retain a validity of their own.19 Muirhead 
cites two former senators, Democrat Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Republican 
Alan Simpson of Wyoming, as model partisans who identified with opposite ideologies 
and often took distinct stances on issues, but who both cultivated warm personal rela-
tionships with members of both parties, prized concrete action over symbolic purity, and 
maintained a knack for legislative deal-making that broke through gridlock and zero-sum 
political calculation in order to further the greater good of the nation.20 
Muirhead thus aims to rescue such a recognition of partisanship’s virtues from in-
creasing attacks in our polarized era by the likes of the Neo-Progressives and the Biparti-
sans. He responds to their critiques by drawing a key normative distinction separating 
“high” partisanship, characterized by cheerful public-spiritedness, respect for the opposi-
tion, and devotion to forging a “connection between the details of policy and the moral 
character of the country,” from the “low” partisanship of narrow ambition, strategic ma-
neuvering, and incessant mutual belligerence.21 The problem with our contemporary pol-
itics is therefore not its deeply partisan character, but the ascendance of the wrong kind 
of partisanship. 
Because The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age concedes that low partisans have 
largely succeeded in supplanting their loftier counterparts, this ostensible intellectual de-
fense of political parties devotes much of its text to deploring a number of visible mani-
festations of party strength in the current era. For example, Muirhead calls for the aboli-
tion of the “Hastert Rule,” an unofficial norm associated with former Republican speaker 
Dennis Hastert that prevents legislation from reaching the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives unless it is backed by a majority of the ruling party, regardless of whether the 
bill would command majority support in the House as a whole.22 He criticizes the presi-
dential administration of George W. Bush for firing federal prosecutors over partisan 
considerations—in at least one case, a U.S. Attorney was forced from office after resist-
ing pressure from Republican officials to seek the indictment of Democratic politi-
cians—and thus infringing on the neutral administration of justice.23 The attempt of the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives to exploit a necessary raise in the feder-
al debt ceiling in 2011 as procedural leverage to extract budgetary concessions from the 
Obama administration also serves, in his view, as an example of low partisanship at its 
most indefensible.24 
In fact, Muirhead is sufficiently critical of our contemporary political environment 
that his faith in the promise of party itself seems to waver. One puzzling digression 
praises Nebraska’s unicameral legislature, the only formally non-partisan state legislative 
body in the nation.25 Strict party-line voting, an unremarkable practice in many parlia-
mentary democracies around the world, is held to deprive enacted legislation of its “dig-
                                                            
 19. MUIRHEAD, supra note 2, at 215. 
 20. Id. at 53. 
 21. Id. at 213. 
 22. Id. at 191-94. 
 23. Id. at 217-24. 
 24. MUIRHEAD, supra note 2, at 248-52. 
 25. Id. at 183-90. 
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss2/11
HOPKINS_3.3.16.DOCX	(DO	NOT	DELETE)	 3/4/16		1:09	AM	
2016] CAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES DISAGREE BUT STILL GET ALONG? 355 
nity” and is thus to be vigorously resisted in American institutions.26 In another passage, 
Muirhead expresses hope for the arrival of a centrist third party to hold the balance of 
power in Congress and thus work to neutralize the ideological extremity of the Demo-
crats and Republicans. After the skillful manner in which The Promise of Party in a Po-
larized Age distinguishes its broader argument from familiar anti-partisan themes, it is 
somewhat disorienting to encounter specific claims that so closely echo those of Neo-
Progressives and Bipartisans, while the improbable future emergence of mass electoral 
support for a Centrist Party dedicated to such causes as “immigration, tax reform, or 
global warming legislation”—much less any evidence that such a party would generate 
sufficient popular enthusiasm to overcome the substantial structural impediments to a 
multi-party system in the United States—also represents a lapse in Muirhead’s normally 
sturdy appreciation of political practicalities.27 
The book thus exhibits a perceptible darkening of tone as it progresses from theory 
to practice. Its extensive and compelling descriptions of the potential virtues of party are 
almost entirely unaccompanied by confirmatory illustrations from the contemporary po-
litical world; tellingly, one of its two specifically identified personal exemplars of high 
partisanship is deceased (Kennedy) and the other (Simpson) long retired from elective 
office. Even the 2010 enactment of the Affordable Care Act, surely a recent milestone in 
the pursuit of many Democrats’ shared conception of the common good, receives sub-
stantial criticism in The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age due to Obama’s insist-
ence—presumably reflecting the advice of political handlers consulting relevant public 
opinion data—on promoting his health care reform proposal to voters by explaining how 
its provisions would serve their own personal interests rather than portraying it as a reali-
zation of broader liberal virtues.28 
The widening rift over the course of the book between ideal and actual party poli-
tics suggests the presence of a serious dilemma. Perhaps the appealing logical distinction 
that The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age draws between the high partisanship of 
principle and the low partisanship of political combat is exceedingly difficult to achieve 
in practice. The act of investing the Democratic and Republican parties with “purpose” 
and “meaning” by bestowing on them the responsibility to hold aloft the twin banners of 
liberal and conservative ideals may raise the stakes of political conflict to a sufficient ex-
tent that the rough tactics of low partisanship become increasingly justified in the eyes of 
party supporters as a means of preventing or limiting the triumph of an opposition devot-
ed to undermining those values. Because bipartisan cooperation requires leaders on both 
sides to remain open to agreement and resistant to demonizing their opponents, a collec-
tively polarized and acrimonious politics can result even if only one of the parties adopts 
an increasingly purist or confrontational disposition. 
Such tradeoffs are not new. In 1950, E. E. Schattschneider led the American Politi-
cal Science Association’s now-defunct Committee on Political Parties in drafting a long 
report entitled “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.”29 In this report, 
                                                            
 26. I d. at 247-48. 
 27. Id. at 199. 
 28. Id. at 211-16. 
 29. Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n., Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 21 (1950). 
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Schatschneider and his colleagues faulted the mid-century American parties for failing to 
present voters with a sufficiently distinct choice of policy alternatives, for lacking the 
internal unity and discipline necessary to implement their stated platforms, and for dis-
playing inadequate responsiveness to the preferences of their respective activist popula-
tions. The committee recommended an extensive series of reform measures intended to 
bolster party “responsibility” by encouraging the leaders of each national party to devel-
op an ambitious legislative program and by providing them the means to enforce adher-
ence to this agenda among officeholders and candidates, arguing that “the party struggle 
is concerned with the direction of public affairs . . . [and] the discussion of public affairs 
for the most part makes sense only in terms of public policy.”30 
Schattschneider and his collaborators explicitly denied that reforming the parties in 
order to ensure the development of extensive and conflicting policy commitments would 
lead to political polarization. “Needed clarification of party policy in itself will not cause 
the parties to differ more fundamentally or more sharply than they have in the past,” they 
predicted.31 
 
Nor is it to be assumed that increasing concern with their programs 
will cause the parties to erect between themselves an ideological wall. 
There is no real ideological division in the American electorate, and 
hence programs of action presented by responsible parties for the vot-
er’s support could hardly be expected to reflect or strive toward such 
division.32 
 
Yet as the parties subsequently became more internally coherent and externally 
distinct in the manner that the committee members envisioned—not because party lead-
ers responded to their report by immediately adopting its roster of recommended re-
forms, but instead due to a number of interlocking historical developments such as the 
inception of the civil rights era, the regional realignment of the South, the decline of pat-
ronage-based political machines, and the rise of the modern conservative movement—
they also became more ideologically differentiated, to the point that some contemporary 
critics view the advocates of party responsibility as having succeeded all too well in real-
izing their objectives. The “clarification of party policy” that the Schattschneider com-
mittee sought ultimately occurred via the growing influence of ideologically-motivated 
activists within the organizational structure of the parties—especially on the Republican 
side—combined with the migration of misfit factions like conservative Democrats and 
liberal Republicans into their more appropriate partisan homes. 
Just as ideological polarization proved to be a natural consequence of a party sys-
tem increasingly organized on the basis of policy differences, the emergence of parties 
that are consciously devoted to upholding distinct sets of principles and values seems 
likely to encourage the increasing use of low partisan tactics in service of these convic-
tions—including electoral mud-slinging, apocalyptic rhetoric, process-related brinkman-
                                                            
 30. Id. at 15. 
 31.   Id. at 20. 
 32. Id. 
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ship, majoritarian ruthlessness, and the violation of previously-respected institutional 
norms (such as the now-automatic use of the filibuster by the minority party in the Sen-
ate, once a rare occurrence). It is hardly a coincidence that the party that is more openly 
dedicated to the advancement of an ideological movement (the Republicans) is also the 
more procedurally aggressive of the two.33 In the current political environment, Republi-
can members of Congress who take a pragmatic, bipartisan approach to governing risk 
suffering a backlash from peers, conservative media personalities, and primary elec-
torates that could threaten their political careers. Given the failures and concessions that 
are inherent in democratic politics, especially in a decentralized constitutional system of 
checks and balances, perhaps it is infeasible in reality to promote a partisanship of prin-
ciples without leaving politicians vulnerable to the charge by other party members that 
they have insufficiently upheld those principles while in office. Even Alan Simpson, cit-
ed in The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age as a personification of partisanship at its 
best, retired from Congress in 1996 after he was removed from a Republican leadership 
position by his Senate colleagues in favor of the more conservative and hard-charging 
Trent Lott of Mississippi. 
To be sure, ideological commitment, partisan loyalty, and governing style are not 
necessarily synonymous; after all, John Boehner and Ted Cruz took similar positions on 
most political issues even as they engaged in a long-running battle over the strategic di-
rection of the congressional Republican Party. But neither are they completely uncon-
nected. The clarification of the two parties’ respective philosophical tenets over the 
course of the past half-century has brought our politics closer to a national debate over 
fundamental ideas, but has also reflected the increasing influence of partisan actors who 
ultimately prefer conflict to compromise. 
While we should entertain no illusions about the practical challenge of realizing 
the ideal of high partisanship while avoiding regular manifestations of low partisanship, 
this objective is not necessarily less attainable than the rival aspirations of the Neo-
Progressives and Bipartisans, who often overstate both the likelihood and the desirability 
of a political world without sharp partisan differences. A modern party system in which 
the two sides regularly agree on most important issues facing the nation is no more real-
istic than one in which disagreement exclusively occurs in a friendly and open-minded 
manner. By emphasizing the civic benefits of robust partisanship, The Promise of Party 
in a Polarized Age provides a welcome intellectual defense of American parties at a time 
in which they are once again taking the brunt of popular frustration with politics, and re-
freshingly acknowledges that the United States is unlikely to return to an era in which 
elected Democrats and Republicans occupied overlapping positions on the ideological 
spectrum. 
With polarization here to stay, it is time for scholars and commentators alike to 
cease entertaining the notion that it can be readily reversed. Instead, we should turn to a 
more open and thorough discussion of the ways in which the polarized party system’s 
most dangerous practical effects might be ameliorated. This dialogue would presumably 
focus on the consideration of institutional reforms to the internal operation of Congress, 
                                                            
 33. JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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but it should also encompass the acknowledgment of the role played by the constitutional 
structure itself in producing frequent procedural stalemate and providing strong incen-
tives for the partisan opposition to obstruct and embarrass the majority. The mass elec-
torate, too, should be held responsible for its own contribution to our current condition. If 
they share Muirhead’s attractive but ambitious vision of a politics of high partisanship 
untainted by the blight of low partisanship, American citizens can help to realize it by 
shifting their support to candidates—in primaries as well as general elections—who 
pledge to fulfill its spirit. 
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